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CLAIRE A. HILL*
Investors know there was a civil war here [in Moldova] and it puts
people off.1
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1997, East Asian financial markets caught the
“Asian flu.”  The crisis began when Thailand’s currency, the baht,
weakened in response to international pressure; the crisis soon
*Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  I wish to acknowledge
helpful conversations with Brian Bix, Bernie Black, Eric Bothwell, Tyler Cowen, Leo Katz and
Charles Trzcinka.  I also wish to acknowledge helpful research assistance of Kate Costenbader,
George Mason University School of Law Class of 1999.
1. An Investment Guide to Moldova, Trouble With Neighbors, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1997,
at Supp. 2-3, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File.
BRANDNEWHILL3MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:32 PM
284 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 8:283
spread throughout the region.2  The flu “worsened” into
“pneumonia,”3 and another crisis erupted in Russia.4  Markets all
over the world have been affected; emerging markets have been par-
ticularly hard hit.
Since the Asian crisis began, foreign investors have been skittish
of all emerging markets investment.5  Many foreign investors have
largely refrained from investing in the region.  They have invested
only in securities with elaborate quality and safety-enhancing mecha-
nisms, or demanded a very high “lemons” discount to reflect their
worst case estimate.6  Before the Asian crisis, investors7 had become
2. See, e.g., Lawrence Summers, Go with the Flow: The Rush to Support Capital-Account
Controls in the Wake of the Asian Crisis is Misconceived, FIN.. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 11, 1998,
at 14.  See also Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing Po-
litical Risk, 38 VA. J. INTL. L. 293, n. 18 and accompanying text (1998) [hereinafter Latin
American Securitization].
3. Summers, supra note 2.  See also Russ Wiles, Loaded for Bear; Don’t Plan on Quick Re-
bound from Asia’s Market Fiasco, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 4, 1998, at D1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Azrep File.
4. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Financial Crises Could Stall Capitalism’s Global March, WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 1998 at A1 [hereinafter Financial Crises].
5. For a time, however, it seemed that investor skittishness was lessening.  See Latin
America: Fragile Finance, Economist, Mar. 21, 1998, at 87.  See also South Korea Prospers on
Debut, CORP. MONEY, Apr. 15, 1998, at 8; Jerry Edgerton, Rebounding Emerging Markets
Bond Funds Offer Lofty Yields-If You Can Handle the Risks, MONEY, May 1998, at 42.
Not too long ago, only investors with an Evel-Knievel-like tolerance for risk would have con-
sidered emerging markets bonds. After all, at last fall’s Asian economic crisis reverberated
through developing nations from the Pacific Rim to Latin America to Eastern Europe, emerg-
ing markets bond prices plummeted by 15%.  Now, in the wake of the International Monetary
Fund’s bailout of Korea and other countries, these bonds have been making a comeback.
But investors’ return to emerging markets investing was short-lived; by the end of April, diffi-
culties in Asia were again receiving investors’ attention and commanding prudence, as were, by
the middle of May, the increasing signs of crisis in Russia.  See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Asia Jitters
Hit Other Markets; Russian, Latin Stock Indexes Drop, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998 at C1
[hereinafter Asia Jitters].
6. My Article explores foreign investors’ reactions to politically risky securities
(securities issued by or on behalf of emerging markets firms or countries), and, principally, re-
actions of foreign investors seeking quality and liquidity, foreign capital market investors.  (I
use the term “securities” broadly to include any financial instrument an investor might buy,
however structured.)  Capital market investors include many of the world’s largest investors.
Some of these investors are institutions subject to quality-favoring regulatory regimes, such as
insurance companies and pension funds.  See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweet-
ener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1070-71 nn.38-44 (1996) (discussing the regulatory
regimes applicable to many institutional investors) [hereinafter Lemons].  Thus, my references
to “investors” are primarily to foreign capital market investors.  Other foreign investors, such
as those who specialize in highly speculative investments, offer less desirable investment terms;
there is less of an analytic puzzle for investment activities in which the investor includes a con-
siderable margin for error.  Thus, my analysis takes account of such investors mainly in charac-
terizing emerging markets investment immediately after a dramatic and unfavorable event has
occured, until the foreign capital markets investors return.  I consider only briefly domestic in-
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sanguine about political risk; the discount for exposure to political
risk had shrunk to low levels.8
The pattern is familiar.  The 1994 peso crisis9 and the Latin
American defaults of the mid-1980s10 were preceded by investing
terms11 that hindsight suggests were too lax.12  For a time afterwards,
investors shied away from emerging markets.13 Eventually, they re-
vestors in a firm’s (politically risky) home country.  The situation for domestic investors in a
country subject to appreciable political risk is analytically distinct: since such investors cannot
really avoid exposure to the risk in any event, the incremental effect of purchasing a particular
firm’s politically risky securities is difficult to untangle.
7. Finance theory characterizes some subset of investors as “arbitrageurs.”  Arbitrageurs
stand ready to identify and correct pricing “mistakes,” including, in some theories, those re-
flecting mistaken assessments of risks.  Arbitrageurs have access to infinite resources to support
their activities.  Other investors, by contrast, may sometimes make incorrect assessments.  For
a discussion of the role of arbitrageurs in finance theory, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Re-
inier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).  In my
account, I generally do not distinguish between arbitrageurs and other investors; rather, all in-
vestors are making a “correct” assessment given information and other limitations.  However,
in Section IV.C, infra, I consider whether some investors may be making pricing mistakes.  In
Section IV.D, infra, I discuss arbitrageurs’ role in correcting those mistakes.
8. See Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2, at 311.  See also Latin America:
Fragile Finance, supra note 5, at 87.
For much of last year [1997], Latin governments and companies could sell bonds
abroad at extraordinarily low rates.  When the market dried up in October, spreads
between Latin American bonds and American Treasury bonds soared. They have
slowly narrowed since then, and some new countries, such as Argentina and Mexico,
have tested the market with new issues. But these have been at shorter terms . . . and
higher rates than they obtained last year.
Id. at 87.  See also Paul Blustein, ‘Spread’ the Bad Word in Emerging Markets’ Downfall,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at E1 [hereinafter Spread].
In April 1997, shortly before the Asian crisis erupted full force, [big institutional in-
vestors] were so eager to participate in the emerging market boom that, according to
the [Institute of International Finance], they were accepting average yields just 1.17
percentage points above Treasuries on bonds in 14 major emerging markets, down
from 3.27 percentage points in October 1995.
Id.
9. See Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2, at 310.
10. See id. at 304-05.
11. For analytic ease, I gloss over risks of these securities other than political risks, some-
times referring to such securities as “politically risky securities;” I also omit mention of the se-
curities’ rewards, speaking as though they only had risk.  I also largely gloss over specific at-
tributes of a security, such as whether it is structured as debt or equity; however, my focus is
principally on debt instruments, since foreign capital markets investors have a longer history of
investing in such instruments.  Moreover, I also gloss over the different types of structures,
some of which are quite elaborate indeed (and others of which are quite simple), except to the
extent I address systematic differences in the investors who invest in particular types of transac-
tions.  Finally, while I focus mostly on passive investors and investments, I include among my
sources materials relating to more active investments, such as running a business; active and
passive investors share many of the same concerns about political risk.
12. See Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2, at 304-05.
13. See id. at 306.
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turned in droves,14 driving down the discount for political risk expo-
sure15 until the Asian crisis jolted it back up.  Future flows securitiza-
tion, a financing technique used by some firms in emerging markets
countries, illustrates the strength of investor reaction to political risk.
The technique minimizes investors’ exposure to political risk, but
only by means of elaborate and costly structuring.16
Both conventional wisdom and ample anecdotal evidence sug-
gest that investors have difficulty with political risk assessment—that
investors often alternate between assessments that, in hindsight, were
either much too high or much too low.17  In a sense, all assessments
that, in retrospect, prove wrong, were either too high or too low—
what else could they be? What makes my claim something other than
trivially tautological is the pattern I hypothesize, of alternating opti-
mism and skittishness.18  As one market participant noted, “[w]e get
lulled into a period where [political risk] seems as if it’s not as impor-
tant as it was in the past.  But there’s always a new nasty shock that
appears.”19  In this Article, I take as a starting point that investor re-
14. Indeed, an interesting, although not surprising, feature of emerging markets invest-
ment is that liquidity is profoundly affected by the course of events.  When the investment cli-
mate is favorable, emerging markets specialists and high-yield specialists are joined by more
safety-conscious institutional investors.  When sentiment turns skittish, the market thins, and
the safety-conscious institutional investors, who represent large amounts of funds, turn else-
where.  Investors know that they do not know very much and reasonably believe that they may
soon know much more.  Therefore, they wait.  See Section IV.B infra.  See also Hill, Latin
American Securitization, supra note 2, at 306 (discussing the history of safety-and-quality con-
scious investors’ return to Latin American markets).
15. Id. at 309 nn.69-71.
16. I discuss future flows securitization as used by emerging markets firms in Hill, Latin
American Securitization, supra note 2.
17. See David Goldman, Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me, FORBES, May 19, 1997, at 279;
Paul Blustein, Investors Reconsider Big Emerging Markets Bets, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at
H1 [hereinafter Investors Reconsider].  My evidence also includes many conversations with
practitioners in the field.
18. For ease of analysis, and consistent with intuition, I somewhat stylize the pattern of inves-
tor sentiment about political risk, and overstate the qualitative differences between such sentiment
and investor sentiment about other risks.  Certainly, particular securities and industries and in-
vestment strategies sometimes enjoy alternating investor confidence (favor) and skittishness
(disfavor).  I cast the distinction between political risk and other, more “standard” risks investors
face as qualitative to capture two intuitions.  First, sentiment about political risk seems more in-
tractably cyclical.  Second, and more importantly, as I argue in this article, the uncertainties sur-
rounding political risk seem (and are) more difficult to address.  In contrast, when an investor buys
a broad-based domestic mutual fund, risks and uncertainties associated with particular securities
need no longer concern her.
19. Harvey Shapiro, Know Your Local Candidates, INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., Oct. 1996, at
54, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inffin File.  The investors described in the following
quote are presumably among those Shapiro’s source is thinking of:
Assets that last year you could not move for love or money are this year’s vogue, said
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action fits the pattern I describe,20 and attempt to account for the pat-
tern.  I explore attributes of political risk that might make it particu-
larly difficult to assess, and how investors might react in the face of
these assessment difficulties.
No one can perfectly predict the future.  In many situations,
however, we can make good predictions, because we can extrapolate
from sufficiently similar, or homogeneous, past events.  We can pre-
dict possible outcomes and their payoffs, as well as their associated
probabilities, with an appreciable degree of confidence and precision.
By contrast, in other situations our predictions require extrapolation
from dissimilar (heterogeneous) events;21 these predictions will not be
nearly as good.  Frank H. Knight, in his classic book Risk, Uncertainty
and Profit,22 distinguished these two situations; he labeled the first
“risk” and the second “uncertainty.”23  Risk can be adequately quan-
tified; the more homogeneous the events, the more we know about
the distribution of possible outcomes.  By contrast, quantification of
Howard Snell, director of emerging markets at Swiss Bank Corp. in London, citing
debt of Sudan and Nicaragua as well as Ivory Coast.  He said such debt was popular
whether the countries have any known means or plans to pay off their debts or not. In
the heady if not always logical world of emerging markets investing, last year’s un-
touchables have become this year’s under-valued icons.  In 1993 an estimated $1 mil-
lion of emerging market debt changed hands in a market centered on London and
New York.  This year, many people expect that figure to double.
See also Erik Ipsen, Mideast and Africa Now Lure Adventurous Investors, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 19, 1994, at A1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Iht File.  Of course, to the extent
investors are buying debt of countries with no known repayment means or plans at anything
other than extremely low prices, I would not argue that their valuations are “the best they can
do;” rather, I would agree with the author of the quote, who clearly believes these investors are
paying too much.
20. More precisely, I assume that the lawyers and bankers I have spoken to, and the com-
mentators writing on the matter, have gauged investor sentiment accurately.  But see note 27,
infra.
21. I argue in Section III.C, infra, that events are not inherently homogeneous or hetero-
geneous, but that for many purposes, we can speak as though they were.
22. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
23. What Knight really meant by uncertainty, and the role the concept plays in his theo-
ries, has been discussed and debated by scholars.  See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Alberto Di
Pierro, Cognition, Choice, and Entrepreneurship, 46 S. ECON. J. 693 (1980); Thomas I. Palley,
Uncertainty, Expectations and the Future: If We Don’t Know the Answers, What are the Ques-
tions, 16 J. POST-KEYNESIAN ECON. 3 (1993), available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Asapii File.
My account follows Knight’s original definition of uncertainty.  See Section III.C, infra.  An-
other term sometimes used by scholars, “ambiguity,” has a similar meaning.  See, e.g., Hillel J.
Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE 41
(Robin M. Hogarth & Mervin W. Reder eds., 1987).  Sometimes, both “uncertainty” and
“ambiguity” are used to refer to an individual’s state of mind rather than a state of the world.
In this usage, an individual could be “uncertain” about a matter engendering certainty in many,
or even most, other individuals.  In my use of the term “uncertainty,” individuals generally are
uncertain.
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“uncertainty” is far more difficult; indeed, the more heterogeneous
the events, the less we know about the distribution of possible out-
comes.24  
Political risk is quite heterogeneous.  Each event differs mark-
edly.  Moreover, as the world changes, the profile of political risk
changes.  Several decades ago, the most feared political risks were na-
tionalization or expropriation, such as occurred in Chile with Ana-
conda Copper.  Now, currency and exchange controls, as well as gen-
eral instability compounded by increasing globalization of markets,
are more prominent in investors’ minds.25  Of course, investors are
continually revising their assessments of all risk and uncertainty with
new information.  Moreover, few assessments they make involve
events which fit comfortably within one homogeneous class; rather,
there is always some degree of heterogeneity.  But few events belong
to classes as heterogeneous as political risk.
Indeed, political risk is not an obvious “class” in the way that, for
instance, “people” or particular colors are.  When we designate
someone as being a person or something as being red, we are typi-
cally not changing the definition of what it means to be a person or
red.26  But a new event within the class of political risk can revise the
definition of political risk itself.  By contrast, for events within more
homogeneous classes, new information should prompt far less revi-
sion: even a dramatic event within a homogeneous class can readily
be incorporated into the previously established probability distribu-
tion.  One business’s failure in the normal course often will not affect
the overall rate of business failures, or the causes thereof.  But an
event involving political risk, such as the recent Asian or Russian cri-
sis, can cause a far larger revision.  The prior probability distribution
was not known with great precision or confidence; the Asian and
Russian crises may very well indicate a dramatic change in the in-
vestment climate in emerging market countries, at least for the near
to moderate term.  
Thus, when assessing political risk during or shortly after a crisis,
24. See KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 233. One article considering the effect of uncertainty
(here, called “ambiguity”) in finance is Jie Hue, Information Ambiguity: Recognizing its Role in
Financial Markets, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, July/Aug. 1994, at 11-21.
25. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
26. Actually, philosophers are notorious for trying to stretch the boundaries of classes eve-
ryone thinks are well-understood.  One famous example involves bachelors who somehow
manage to be married.  Fred Schauer justly denigrates these types of examples as “arguments
from weird cases.”  Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 419-423 (1985)
(“. . .the argument from weird cases says almost nothing at all.”  Id. at 423.)
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investors use the best information they have—information as to the
recent crisis.  They stay out of the market or demand very high rates.
If time passes without incident, investors eventually obtain sufficient
positive information to reverse the negative impact of a crisis: stabil-
ity continues, investors get their promised returns, and perhaps, the
country takes steps to clarify and expand enforcement of firm-
investor bargains.  But there is a lag during which the lemons dis-
count remains high.  Emerging market securities then become attrac-
tive, more investors enter the market,27 and the discount shrinks.
Sooner or later, another crisis occurs, and the cycle begins again.  
On this account cycling of investor sentiment does not lead to in-
correct pricing.28  Rather, it represents a rational investor’s best guess.
When the investor appraises as plausible an event with very bad con-
sequences, he refrains from investing (or demands a very high dis-
count); when he does not, he may invest, taking only a small lemons
discount.  This response is the best investors and the market can do.  
Two other dynamics might contribute to cycling: investor irra-
tionality,29 and institutional and regulatory incentives for investors to
“stay with the pack.”  Both dynamics could lead investors to pay
27. Here, as in this Article more generally, I gloss over differences among different
emerging markets firms, industries, countries and regions, treating emerging markets invest-
ment as monolithic.  The differences are significant, but not in ways that affect my analysis.
One caveat, though: one difference that is significant is the “panic-selling” of emerging markets
investments in countries with sound ‘fundamentals’ (including, for this purpose, very little po-
litical risk.)  My focus in this Article is on investor reaction to emerging markets investment in
countries with appreciable political risk.  Where the panic-selling reflects “contagion,” not of
bad economic developments, but of ‘pure’ sentiment, I would not make the claim that investors
were being rational.  Rather, I would tell a story akin to Keynes’ famous ‘beauty contest’ story,
in which investors are trying to outguess each other rather than compute (or guess) fundamen-
tals.  See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
154-56 (1936).  Admittedly, in practice, the ‘pure’ cases of ‘pure’ sentiment and bad economic
developments may be hard to find.  I stylize the distinction between sentiment and bad eco-
nomic developments to more sharply delineate between investor irrationality and rationality.
Certainly some, and perhaps even many, commentators would attribute both investor skittish-
ness and confidence largely to irrationality.  See, e.g, Blustein, Spread, supra note 8, at E4
(quoting an Institute of International Finance study as asserting that “spreads fell much further
than can be explained by changes in economic fundamentals.”).  Blustein characterizes inves-
tors’ reactions immediately after the inception of the Asian crisis as a rush “for the exits en
masse. . .after [they were] suddenly. . .seized by pessimism.”  For purposes of my analysis, while
I acknowledge that there may be an irrational component to investor sentiment, I also mini-
mize its size in order to make the more difficult case for investor rationality.
28. See Section III.A, infra, for a discussion of pricing methodology in finance theory.
29. Richard Thaler, one of the leading proponents of the behavioral approach in finance,
labels investors who are irrational in systematic ways as “quasi-rational;”  the “irrational” in-
vestors I discuss would be “quasi-rational” in Thaler’s terminology.  See RICHARD THALER,
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 241 (1991).
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“incorrect” prices.  Investors might irrationally overreact to recent
crises by demanding too high a discount, and irrationally underreact
to periods of calm by accepting too low a discount.30 Or compensation
arrangements, or regulatory regimes, might lead even rational inves-
tors to maintain a certain level of emerging markets investments,
even if they had to pay incorrect prices to do so.  But arbitrageurs—
”smart money”—should be available (and inclined) to move prices
back towards the correct levels; any mispricings thus should be short-
lived, small, or both.31
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I briefly trace in-
vestors’ reactions to political risk in four recent crises, and describe
political risk.  In Section III, I revisit the standard finance theory
treatment of risk.32  Finance theory assumes that we know each possi-
ble outcome, and the payoff and probability associated with each
outcome.  Risk is then determined by arithmetic.  This assumption,
while obviously wrong, arguably works sufficiently well to price secu-
rities in most cases.  I argue, however, that there are certain risks, in-
cluding political risk, for which payoffs and probabilities are suffi-
30. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Future Of Law And Economics: Looking Forward: Be-
havioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183-84 (1997) (discussing “unrealistic op-
timism” and “overconfidence”); Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 285-86 (1948) (discussing overestimation of bad
outcomes). See generally, THALER, supra note 29.  See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne-
man, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1174 (1974), discussing
the “availability heuristic.”  If an event is more “available”—that is, comes readily to mind—it
will loom large in probability assessments.  If a person knows several people who have recently
had heart attacks, he may overestimate the likelihood of heart attacks in the general popula-
tion.  And surely the Asian and Russian crises and other notorious events for a time make
memories of political risk more “available.”  But a crucial point of the behavioral work is typi-
cally that these assessments are incorrect.  There is some “fact of the matter” such as the actual
rate of heart attacks in the general population against which the person’s assessment can be
judged and found correct or not.  By contrast, in my account there is no corollary to “the actual
rate of heart attacks in the general population.”  Intuitively, we think that some assessments as
to political risk and other “uncertain” matters would be “wrong,” even though it is hard to ar-
ticulate how we would assess something as “right” or “wrong” except as against a “fact of the
matter.”  Indeed, there is no “fact of the matter” as to most things investors assess, in the way
there is about the rate of heart attacks or other “natural” phenomena.  Nevertheless, remarka-
bly, we can usually speak intelligibly as though there were. See Section III.C, infra.
31. I argue in Section IV.D, infra, that arbitrageurs might not return prices of politically
risky securities to “correct” levels in as quick or complete fashion as they would for securities
involving less uncertainty.
32. See generally RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 81-134 (2nd ed. 1995) (explaining risk, diversification, and asset
pricing models, including the Capital Asset Pricing Model); See also RICHARD A. BREALY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 976-77 (5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter
BREALEY & MYERS].
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ciently ill-understood that the standard model works less well.  These
“risks” rise to the level Frank Knight characterized as “uncertainty.”
In Section IV, I consider how investors react in the face of uncer-
tainty.  Investors do not know—and know that they do not know—-
what the future holds.  They do know, however, that the future may
be perilous. Dramatic events falling within the “class” of political risk
occur periodically, but at widely varying intervals; investors will cycle
between skittishness and confidence, as new events cause significant
revisions to their beliefs and assessments.  Investors’ assessment
methodologies thus take into account the heterogeneity of political
risk. In sum, politically risky securities will not be “mispriced”; how-
ever, the standard finance models will not readily compute the
“correct” price.  Section IV also considers broader implications of
uncertainty for Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance
theorem.33  Section V concludes.
II.  POLITICAL RISK34
A.  History and Recent Events
In the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, sovereigns and
firms defaulted on loans made by foreign banks.  Latin American
firms found it difficult to attract foreign investment from investors
other than “yield-chasing” speculators offering very unfavorable
terms.  One response was to create a transaction structure, future
flows securitization, which insulated foreign investors from some
measure of political risk.  This transaction structure segregates a
firm’s foreign currency cash flows from the firm, and indeed, from
the firm’s home country; foreign investors are repaid from those cash
flows.  The cash flows easiest to segregate from a firm’s home coun-
try are those not yet in existence, the firm’s “future flows.”35
33. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
34. My discussion is adapted from Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2.
35. The structure minimizes investors’ exposure to political risk in several ways.  First,
payments on the securitization securities come from cash flows that never enter the emerging
market country’s borders.  The risk of sovereign interference thus should be smaller and easier
to quantify.  Indeed, a sovereign has fewer ways to interfere with payments on future flows se-
curitization securities than payments on most other types of securities.  Once the goods or
services have been exported, sovereign interference becomes more limited and difficult; the
sovereign’s only choice may be to restrict export of the product or service which is to generate
the future receivable.
Other features of the transaction also make sovereign interference more difficult.  The
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The transaction structure helps assuage investors’ fears about
political risk.  As I explain in the next subsection, political risk en-
compasses a range of possible events.  It might mean that a firm will
have difficulty obtaining foreign exchange or sending it out of the
country; that the repayment obligation, or some other important as-
pect of the transaction with a foreign investor, will not be enforced;
or that political, legal or economic factors will make it difficult for the
firm to obtain sufficient funds to timely meet its obligations.  The
structuring complexity of future flows securitization transactions is
enormous.  Consider, in particular, the multiple jurisdictions in-
volved, as well as the conceptual and legal difficulty of creating rights
and interests in assets not yet in existence.  Moreover, many of the
transactions contain elaborate quality and credit-enhancing mecha-
nisms.  Transaction volume is significant,36 suggesting that investors
must be quite fearful of political risk.
The first emerging markets securitization transaction was as safe
as such a transaction conceivably could have been.  It involved dollar-
denominated receivables owed by AT&T to the Mexican govern-
ment-owned telephone company, TelMex.37  Although the receiv-
ables were not yet generated when the transaction was consummated,
future generation of the receivables turned almost exclusively on
people in the United States continuing to make phone calls to Mexico
in sufficient volume—a very high probability event.
Once this transaction had been completed, investors were ready
to consider other, less gilt-edged transactions, where the foreign obli-
gor was a bit less venerable or the goods or services were perhaps less
certain to generate receivables in the future.  Simpler structures be-
came possible for many issuers.  Then, in late 1994, Mexico experi-
enced a financial crisis in which its currency was devalued by forty
percent.38  This crisis made foreign investors “flee to quality” but the
transaction specifies in detail each step involved in generating the receivables and paying the in-
vestors; sovereign interference is therefore likely to be quite visible.  Furthermore, sovereign inter-
ference might require pursuing funds in foreign jurisdictions which pride themselves on being
commerce-and-investor friendly.  Often, a pool—the obligor on the securitization securities—is
located in an offshore haven, such as the Cayman Islands.  A sovereign would presumably con-
clude that attempting to recover funds located in a such a jurisdiction would be costly and probably
futile.  In sum, investor exposure to political risk is minimized.  Investors may be more exposed to
one particular component of political risk, namely export-related risks.  Still, their exposure is less
than it would be with a direct obligation of the firm.
36. See Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2, at 294.
37. I discuss the TelMex transaction in Hill, Latin American Securitization, supra note 2, at
115-16.
38. See Richard Halstead, West Braces for Asia Fallout, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Aug.
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flight was comparatively brief.  Soon, spreads over Treasury bonds
fell again as investors’ memories faded.
More recently, world markets, and particularly emerging mar-
kets, have been affected by crises in Asia and Russia.  The Asian cri-
sis began in July of 1997 when Thailand abandoned efforts to defend
its currency, the baht, and the baht’s value declined dramatically.39
Since then, many Asian economies have been in crisis.  This spring,
political and economic problems in Russia began to command world
attention;40 in addition to the Asian flu, there is now a crisis in Russia,
with the Russian economy (and arguably, the Russian government)
nearing collapse.41
Since the Asian crisis began, many Latin American countries
have also experienced volatile financial markets.  Until this spring, it
had appeared that their cases of “Asian flu” might be comparatively
mild.42  However, at this writing, the compounded effect of the two
crises, together with underlying domestic weaknesses, appear to have
taken their toll: market volatility and associated economic turbulence
seems to be increasing in all emerging markets, including those in
Latin America.43  Developed country financial markets, too, have
been volatile: indeed, on August 31, 1998, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average dropped 512 points.44  Many investors are again looking
back with regret to the narrow spreads they charged on their securi-
ties, being more wary in the present, and vowing not to forget so
quickly in the future.  At some point, though, investors will likely re-
turn to the market, and the cycle will begin again.
B. Political Risk
Political risk is nowhere canonically defined.  Rather, it is a
large, amorphous category.45  It contains “sovereign risk”, in this con-
31, 1997, at 1; Financial Sector and Pension Reform, LATIN FIN., Mar. 1997, at M35, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Latfin File.
39. See Blustein, Investors Reconsider Big Bets, supra note 16.
40. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Asia Jitters, supra note 5.
41. See Blustein, Financial Crisis, supra note 4.
42. See supra note 5.
43. See Blustein, Financial Crises, supra note 4.  See also A Shaky Week for the World’s
Stock Markets, NEW YORK TIMES, August 30, 1998.  The article consists of a chart setting forth
the dramatic declines in many of the world’s stock markets; today, the chart would be even
more dramatic, as many markets have fallen even further since the date of the article.
44. See Robert McFadden, The Market Turmoil: Voices; ‘It’s Disturbing, To Put It Mildly,’
But Investors Say They’ll Hold On, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998 at A1.
45. Consider, for example, one popular approach to appraising political risk, the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide, created in 1980 by the editors of International Reports.  See Robin
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text meaning the risk that the sovereign will interfere with a firm’s
ability to pay its investors as promised.  It also contains various po-
litical, economic and country-specific risks.  Perhaps the best one can
do, other than making a laundry list, is to articulate the underlying
concept of virtually all political risks: risks associated with business or
investment in a country which would not be present in another coun-
try with a more stable and developed business and economic climate
and regulatory regime.
The classic political risks include expropriation or nationaliza-
tion, where a sovereign simply takes property without compensation.
As one commentator noted,
[o]nce the quintessential political risk was epitomized by the
sudden rise to power of a new leader, perhaps an aggressive
young army colonel, or an earnest guerrilla in army fatigues.
Committed to the greater glory of the country or the prole-
tarian revolution, he would nationalize your company, ex-
propriate your property and freeze your financial assets.46
A notorious example of nationalization was Chile’s 1969 nation-
alization of Anaconda Copper, a U.S. firm.  Chile offered the firm’s
L. Diamonte, John M. Liew & Ross L. Stevens, Political Risk in Emerging and Developed
Markets, FIN. ANALYSTS J., MAY/JUNE 1996, at 71 (“Banks, multinational corporations, im-
porters, and exporters, among others, use the ICRG model to determine the risks of operating
in, investing in, or lending to particular countries”).  A country’s political risk score is com-
puted by weighting the following individual scores:
a) Economic Expectations versus Reality (12%)
b) Economic Planning Failures (12%)
c) Political Leadership (12%)
d) External Conflict (10%)
e) Corruption in Government (10%)
f) Military in Politics (6%)
g) Law and Order Tradition (6%)
h) Racial and Nationality Tensions (6%)
i) Organized Religion in Politics (6%)
j) Political Terrorism (6%)
k) Civil War Risks (6%)
l) Political Party Development ( 6%)
m) Quality of Bureaucracy (6%).
Id. at 75, 76.
See also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 32, at 967-77; STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED
FINANCE RATINGS: SECURITIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 27-28 (1997); DAVID A. JODICE,
POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 5-6 (1985); Claude B. Erb et al., Political Risk, Economic Risk,
and Financial Risk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1996, at 6.  Some definitions of political risk
are broader than others; definitions also vary in degree of precision.  For purposes of this Arti-
cle, I will define political risk quite broadly, perhaps sacrificing some degree of precision.
46. See generally Shapiro, supra note 19, at 54.
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owners much less compensation than the firm was worth.47  Countries
also expropriate their own citizens’ wealth.  For instance, Peru na-
tionalized its banks in 1987.48 Other classic political risks are
“creeping” expropriation as well as political violence.49  More re-
cently, investors worry more about other political risks, specifically, a
country’s imposition of currency and exchange rate restrictions, and
failure to enforce or respect agreed-upon property and contract
rights.50
Other notorious examples where unexpected events caused in-
vestors to suffer spectacular losses include the following.  When Aya-
tollah Khomeni ousted the Shah, Iran implemented a series of na-
tionalization initiatives applicable to foreigners’ property.51  Mexico
announced it would not pay its debts in 1982 and set off a regional
crisis.52  History seemed to be repeating itself with the peso crisis of
1994, when Mexico’s currency dropped precipitously.53  Other exam-
ples include Venezuela’s imposition of exchange and currency con-
trols in 1994, precipitated by a collapse in its banking system.54  And,
most recently of course, the Asian and Russian crises have struck.55
Less dramatic, but still troubling for investors, was the Chinese gov-
ernment’s precipitous termination in 1995 of McDonald’s twenty-
47. Chile: Controversial Copper Nut Nationalization, LATIN AM. NEWSL., July 4, 1969, at
212, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File. The Overseas Private Insurance Corpora-
tion (OPIC), an agency of the U.S. government involved in insuring against political risk, paid
out $350 million to the owners of the company.  OPIC was eventually able to recover $140 mil-
lion from the Chilean government.  See Edward T. Hearn, U.S. Insurer Points to Eastern
Europe; Some Business Risk Factors Covered, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 11, 1990, at sec. 7, 5.  My
analysis does not expressly deal with insurance as a response to political risk.  Investors will, of
course, pay more for insured securities than uninsured ones.  The higher amount investors will
have to pay for insured securities, and indeed, whether firms will obtain insurance for their se-
curities, will reflect where investors are in the cycle of sentiment.
48. Fights On Over Peru Bank Policy, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 13, 1987, at sec. 3, 5.
49. “Political violence” consists of violent acts undertaken with the primary intent of
achieving a political objective.
50. See Shapiro, supra note 19.  Shapiro’s sources differ about the situation today.  Some
believe that today’s risks are different, and smaller.  Others caution not to “ignore the old
fashioned political risks.  They continually appear and reappear in different parts of the world.”
Id.
51. Donald A. Wendon, Jr., Nationalization and Iran’s Race Against Time, MIDDLE E.
EXECUTIVE REP., Sept. 1979, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mdeast File.
52. Harvey P. Shapiro, A Less Dismal Scenario, INSTIT. INVEST., Sept. 1997, at 110.
53. See note 38 and accompanying text, supra.
54. Foreign Investors Give Venezuela a Wide Berth, Reuters Fin. Serv., Mar. 7, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reufin File.
55. See discussion at Part II.A, supra.
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year lease for a site in Beijing.56  The Chinese government eventually
paid McDonald’s $13.2 million in compensation, but the dispute took
two years to resolve.57
Among investors’ greatest fears may be the ascension to power
of a figure like former Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Re-
public.  He spent in excess of $20 million, an amount representing a
significant portion of his country’s foreign reserves, to give himself a
grand coronation on a solid gold throne.58  He was deposed and later
56. See Thomas L. Friedman, Fed Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A29; See also Eric
Margolis, Burger Wars in Beijing, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 16, 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Torsun File.
At Beijing’s hottest retail location—the corner of Wangfujing and Dongchan’an Ave-
nues—sits a lonely, beleaguered McDonald’s, surrounded by demolished buildings.
This, the world’s biggest burger emporium, is the unlikely battleground between East
and West.  McDonald’s thought it had a long lease until a Chinese consortium, with
strong government connections, bought the sight and ordered the restaurant out to
make way for a major shopping center.  The McDonald’s people screamed blue mur-
der.  The western media, which usually bash McDonald’s for stripping rain forests and
nutritional incorrectness, this time have championed Ronald McDonald. McDonald’s
ouster, combined with widespread Chinese counterfeiting of foreign videos and soft-
ware, provoked a storm of anti-Chinese resentment.  Chinese, thundered the media
and politicians, are a nation of crooks.
Id.
Another article noted:
[p]rotecting a brand name in the China market often resembles a mission impossible.
A bogus Chinese breakfast cereal product called Kongalu cornstrips has a trademark
and packaging identical to that of Kellogg’s cornflakes.  A small Chinese computer
manufacturer, Mr. Sun, has appropriated the trademark of Sun Microsystems for its
machines.  And mineral-water drinkers in China can enjoy Pabst Blue Ribbon Water.
Louis Kraar, The Risks Are Rising In China: Take An Ailing Patriarch, Inflation, Rampant Cor-
ruption, And A Culture That Considers Counterfeiting Cool, And What Have You Got? A Pile
of Potential Problems, FORTUNE, Mar. 6, 1995, at 180.
57. See Friedman, supra note 56.
Another example involves India:
Just as foreign investors have been waking up to the idea that India is open for busi-
ness, local politicians have started putting up the closed signs—literally, in the case of
KFC, better known as Kentucky Fried Chicken.  On November 11th, health inspector
in Delhi closed the recently opened branch of KFC.  They had discovered two flies
and some uncollected rubbish.  By local standards, this is a miracle of cleanliness:
there are more flies in the parliament building’s cafeteria or the press club in Delhi.
But Delhi’s local government is run by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), which views Colonel Sanders and his chickens as cultural imperialists.  In shut-
ting the new restaurant it was simply following the example of the Janata Dal gov-
ernment in the southern city of Bangalore, which closed KFC’s first branch in India
two months ago, citing impermissibly high levels of monosodium glutamate in the
chickens.
Is India Open for Business?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 37.
58. See Emperor Bokassa I Crowned, FACTS ON FILE NEWS DIG., Dec. 10, 1977, at 946
D2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Facts File; Jean Pierre Massamba-Ngolio, Former Cook
Says Bokassa Ate Human Body Stuffed With Rice, Reuters Ltd., Mar. 3, 1987, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.  Bokassa may seem extreme, but one commentator charac-
terized subsequent history as being even worse.  The commentator, writing in early 1995, de-
scribed the situation in parts of West Africa as “a postmodern barbarism unconnected to any
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tried for cannibalism; his chef testified to having stuffed bodies with
rice and served them to Bokassa.59  Bokassa’s regime was not likely to
be solicitous of firm-investor bargains.  Might another comparable
person succeed in taking over another country?  It may not be likely;
however, investors may not feel comfortable concluding that it is too
remote to warrant concern.  More generally, most of the dramatic
political risk stories seem unlikely, but how confident can we be that
they may not become more likely?  Investors typically will not invest
in countries where the ascension of a Bokassa-like figure would be
considered conceivable, except at enormous “lemons” discounts; still,
such events are part of the overall picture of political risk investors
must assess.
III. ON RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
A. Pricing Securities: The Standard Model
In the standard finance model,60 investors compute how much
they will pay for each security by computing the security’s expected
return and covariance with the market portfolio.61  In the model, all
the elements of these computations are known—indeed, everything
about the future is known except which state of the world will hap-
pen.  Each possible outcome is naturally linked to a payoff which is in
turn naturally linked to a probability.  Each payoff is multiplied by its
probability; each payoff/probability product is added to yield ex-
pected return.  Indeed, the classic paradigms of risk are lottery tickets
and coin tosses.  In both cases, the payoffs (or, in the case of the coin
African past.  The Uganda of Idi Amin and the Central African ‘Empire’ of the egregious Jean-
Bedel Bokassa seem rational enterprises compared with the inadvertent and apocalyptic nihil-
ism practiced [in parts of West Africa] and in Rwanda.”  William Pfaff, A New Colonialism?
Europe Must Go Back Into Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1995, at 2.
59. See Jean-Pierre Bgolio, “Bokassa Testifies: ‘I am not a cannibal,’” UPI, Mar. 2, 1987;
available in LEXIS, News Library, Upi File; Robert Chalmers, People for Tea, INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Mar. 22, 1991, at 17.
60. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 32, at 101-34; BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 32, at
179-87.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM, is the dominant model; in any event, the
formula for its main competitor, Arbitrage Pricing Theory, includes payoffs, probabilities, and
market covariances, in addition to other elements.  See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note
32, at 190-91.
61. A security’s covariance with the market portfolio reflects how much the security can
be expected to change in value when the market increases some percent in value.  Covariance
is a function of the “systematic,” or market, risks this security involves.  Systematic risks are
risks of the market as a whole.  Risks that are not “systematic” are “unsystematic,” that is, par-
ticular to a firm or group of firms.  BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 32, at 156.
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toss, outcomes) are known, as are the associated probabilities.  In the
case of the lottery, the possible outcomes are the payoffs; the associ-
ated probabilities are, for a lottery in which there is one winning
ticket and one hundred tickets in all, one percent for the winning
payoff and ninety-nine percent for the losing payoffs.62
B. Difficulties with the Standard Model
In the real world, of course, payoffs and probabilities can only be
estimated.  In the typical case involving developed markets—that is,
where political risk has been considered negligible63—the estimates of
payoff and probability are often good enough, as I will argue in sec-
tion III.C.64  For political risk, estimates are much worse65—much to
62. In the model, a security’s covariance is known as well.  The model also assumes that
investors can construct and buy a portfolio of securities (the “market portfolio”) which tracks
the performance of the market.  Buying the market portfolio permits the investor to diversify
away all risks particular to firms or groups of firms; as a result, investors bear only systematic,
or market, risk, the amount of which is measured by the covariance of each of their securities
with the market.  Thus, the investor knows how to diversify away certain risks, and has a for-
mula with which to price the remaining ones.
63. However, as the Asian and Russian crises have shown, increasing globalization of
markets means that political risk may have become more important for developed country
firms and markets: markets all over the world have exhibited enourmous volatility in response
to the crises.  The effects continue to be felt worldwide.  See e.g., Blustein, Financial Crises, su-
pra note 4.  The causal link between the Asian crisis and volatility in developed country mar-
kets has been clearer than the link between the Russian crisis and such volatility; still, the Rus-
sian crisis has undoubtedly been a significant contributor to the volatility.
64. Estimates of covariance with the market portfolio may be good enough as well.  In-
deed, droves of financial analysts are continuously computing and recomputing these numbers.
Of course, they can only compute past covariances; the premise is that future covariance will
resemble past covariance.  It should, at least sufficiently well to serve as a basis for setting
prices, if covariance falls within Knight’s category of “statistical probability” rather than his
category of an “estimate.”  See Section III.C, infra. Finally, selecting a portfolio sufficiently
close to the market portfolio may very well be feasible, given the advanced state of finance re-
search.  Thus, investors should only be exposed to the market risk; they have diversified away
all other risks.  At least, this would have been the story told, before the recent tumult in world
markets.  The crash of 1987 caused some rethinking of finance theory; the present events may
cause some further, and perhaps more dramatic, rethinking.
65. Application of the remainder of the model is also uneasy. Indeed, the concepts of
“market,” “systematic risk” and “unsystematic risk” may not be readily applicable.  What is the
relevant “market” for which investors would need to construct a market portfolio?  Thus far,
while the trend is towards greater integration of markets, most investors invest locally; capital
markets are national, rather than international.  See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 32, at 970.
See also Martin S. Feldstein, Global Capital Flows; Too Little, Not Too Much, ECONOMIST,
June 24, 1995, at 72 (“Although most of the legal barriers to international capital mobility are
now gone, the world capital market remains essentially segmented along national lines.”).  See
also John J. Schmitz, The Heritage of International Finance, 13 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. SCI. 163
(1996) available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File.  (“The majority of finance theories are not
explicitly single-country theories, because they are implicitly intended to be universal theories.
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the consternation of investors, because the risks are potentially cata-
strophic.  As I discussed in Section II.B, there are many dramatic ex-
amples of political risk where investors have incurred huge losses due
to some precipitous, unexpected event.  To apply the standard fi-
nance model’s pricing formula, investors need estimates of payoffs
and probabilities; as I will argue below, for political risk, their esti-
mates are simply not “good enough.”66
Why are the estimates not good enough?  Because political risk
is quite uncertain.  The events comprising the class are extremely
heterogeneous, vastly complicating the task of assessing probabilities
and payoffs.  Of course, heterogeneity and uncertainty are matters of
degree: most matters investors assess are uncertain, and belong to
heterogeneous classes.  But the degree of heterogeneity and uncer-
tainty is greater for political risk: Estimates of payoff and probability
are not of a caliber to permit straightforward application of the stan-
dard finance model’s pricing formula.67
Nevertheless, they do not explicitly acknowledge in their assumptions or theoretical develop-
ments the existence of differences between nations.”).  Schmitz concludes that neither interna-
tional CAPM nor APT is “capable of capturing the complexity of international asset markets.”
Id.
Even if we could determine what the relevant market was, constructing a “market
portfolio” would present its own difficulties.  We would have to determine which risks were
systematic in that market.  And even if all these questions could be answered, would political
risk be systematic or unsystematic?  Some actions might affect only one firm; other actions
might have much broader effects.  Indeed, what investors do know about political risk likely
does not include how to diversify the risk away.  Some political risk might be systematic, and
thereby not amenable to diversification.  There might be no relevant “market” as to which a
market portfolio diversifying away the systematic risk could be constructed.  Or there might be
such a market, but constructing the market portfolio might be impossible. Thus, ready applica-
bility of CAPM or another pricing model to emerging markets investment is not straightfor-
ward.  See also Feldstein, at 72 (noting that “[t]he reluctance of portfolio managers to invest
more in foreign securities may reflect a broader measure of risk than the historic covariances
on which the economic analysis is based, including a concern about low-probability events, such
as repayment default or currency non-convertibility.”).
66. “Good enough” for many securities may simply mean good enough with respect to a
small, readily constructed portfolio of securities, rather than for each security in the portfolio;
in the aggregate, the errors would largely cancel each other out.  But with politically risky secu-
rities, even the estimate for the group would not be good enough-the estimates for each secu-
rity would be worse, and the aggregate errors might very well not cancel each other out.  For
analytic ease, so long as estimates for a constructible portfolio are good enough, I speak as
though estimates for each security in the portfolio were good enough.
67. Another way to articulate my thesis uses the terminology of the Asset Pricing Theory:
political risk is “priced.”  In an APT-type model, the pricing of politically risky securities would
include additional factors, perhaps one reflecting political risk itself, or the degree of “estimation
risk” by which the payoffs and probabilities for politically risky securities would be expected to be
in error.  I am not suggesting that either APT, or CAPM, would yield incorrect prices for politi-
cally risky securities.  Rather, I am making a more modest claim, that use of the models to price
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C. Uncertainty
In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Frank Knight distinguishes three
types of “probability”: (1) a priori probability, (2) statistical prob-
ability, and (3) estimates.68  A priori probability requires “[a]bsolutely
homogenous classification of instances completely identical except
for really indeterminate factors”;69 coin tosses and lottery tickets are
the paradigm examples. Most real-world events are not repeated it-
erations of one another the way coin tosses and lotteries are; thus we
can have less confidence in our assessments of probabilities as to such
events than we can about coin tosses and lotteries.70  Indeed, statisti-
cal probability lacks such homogenous classification; thus, “we can-
not . . . calculate the true probability from external data, but must de-
rive it from an inductive study of a large group of cases.”71  Life
expectancy rates are examples of statistical probabilities.
An estimate is to be distinguished from either type of probabil-
ity:
[t]here is no possibility of forming in any way groups of in-
stances of sufficient homogeneity to make possible a quanti-
tative determination of true probability72. . . .
Where all we have are estimates, we do not have “risk;” rather,
we have “uncertainty.”  According to Knight, uncertainty is “one of
the fundamental facts of life.”73   
The practical difference between . . . risk and uncertainty, is
that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group
of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or
the securities ex ante would be clumsy, difficult, and perhaps, intractably, more ‘art’ than ‘science.’
The process would scarcely be mechanical, as one might more typically expect from a quantitative
model.  As to APT, how would we go about estimating the political risk or estimation risk
“factor”?  I discuss difficulties in applying CAPM to politically risky securities in note 65, supra,
and accompanying text.  Moreover, as I discuss in Section IV. B, supra, the models do not capture
how investors take account of uncertainty; to the contrary, the models, by implicitly assuming per-
fect information, or at least, information far superior than exists in the real world, gloss over differ-
ences in degree and kind among different types of risks and uncertainties.
68. Knight thinks that the first two are “true” probabilities and the third is not.  I gloss
over this distinction, because my analysis deals only with Knight’s third category, “estimates.”
Thus, my analysis is consistent with the Bayesian view that purported statistical probabilities
are actually estimates. See KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 224-25, 231.
69. Id. at 224.
70. See Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 23, at 43-46.  Einhorn and Hogarth note that
“when assessing uncertainty in real world tasks, the precision of the gambling analogy can be
misleading.” Id. at 42, 43.
71. Id. at 230-31.
72. KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 231.
73. Id. at 347.
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from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncer-
tainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is
impossible to form a group of instances, because the situa-
tion dealt with is in a high degree unique.74
Knight describes various ways of dealing with uncertainty, in-
cluding “increas[ing] our knowledge of the future through scientific
research and the accumulation and study of the necessary data.”75
Knight also considers consolidation of uncertainties (including
through insurance), specialization in risk-bearing, and increasing con-
trol over the future.76  Through these techniques and others, investors
are able to compute probabilities and payoffs sufficient to price stan-
dard risks.  But these techniques are not sufficient to price political
risk (or politically risky securities) with precision, at least at present.
The techniques are used and do help to reduce the uncertainty
enough that  investors are sometimes willing to buy politically risky
securities.  But the uncertainty is not eliminated;  significant uncer-
tainty remains.
Compare the predictions one can make about life expectancy
with those one can make about the course of the Asian and Russian
crises.  Notwithstanding considerable heterogeneity among people’s
diseases—that is, notwithstanding that people’s diseases are much
less like one another than lottery tickets and coin tosses—we know
quite a bit about, and make very good predictions about, how long
people will live, and from what causes they will die.  Assume we des-
ignate payoffs that very roughly correlate to life or death or various
diseases: investors in politically risky security X are repaid (a) in full;
(b) fifty percent; or (c) zero  percent.  How would we determine
which outcomes led to those payoffs, and the probabilities of those
outcomes?  With coin tosses, we know the laws under which the
probabilities are determined.  With life expectancy, we have a great
deal of data from which to determine probabilities.  With political
risk, we have data as well, but the data is not readily categorized.
What do we learn about the future from the reign of Emperor Bo-
kassa, the expropriation of Anaconda Copper, or the Mexican peso
crisis?  We clearly learn something.  But we do not learn anything
that helps us predict the future nearly as well as studying past statis-
tics about death and disease helps us predict future life expectancy.
The more heterogeneous the class, the more difficult it is to learn
74. KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 233.
75. Id. at 347.
76. Id. at 239, 347.
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from the past;77 heterogeneity assures that even identifying an event
as a member of the class is complex.  Death and disease may not con-
stitute homogenous classes, but the classes are far more homogenous
than political risk.
Consider the prospects of an established business.  Investors and
analysts consider their assessments of probability good enough to
guide investment with a fair measure of confidence.  Intuition sug-
gests the assessment is far from mechanical; certainly, the events to
be classified are not “homogeneous,” much less “absolutely homoge-
neous.”78  Still, we have arguably identified many of the salient fea-
tures necessary to formulate probabilities and payoffs sufficiently ac-
curate to yield a good assessment.  Through use of the various
techniques described by Knight, the uncertainty has been reduced,
such that the estimates are arguably good enough to permit ready use
of our standard pricing models.
Another feature of political risk contributes to its heterogeneity:
the complex manner in which the actors involved respond to incen-
tives.79  What kinds of decisions will Boris Yeltsin make?  How will
77. More generally, learning from the past requires identifying the salient features of an
event—something that only becomes possible after many such events have occurred.  The less
homogeneous the events are, the more difficult it is to learn from experience, and the more
difficult it is to have confidence that one has learned sufficiently from experience—that the les-
sons one has learned have been the right ones.  (I discuss the difficulties of learning from expe-
rience in Why Contracts are Written in Legalese (working paper, on file with Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law)). Traditional accounts of information acquisition tend to
obscure this problem.  They treat lack of information as though it could necessarily and me-
chanically be remedied by an expenditure of costs.  The only relevant determination is whether
those costs are warranted given the benefits to be obtained.  But in many cases, the benefits of
additional information may not be straightforward, nor may it be clear that an expenditure of
costs in fact yields additional “information” at all.
78. Indeed, homogeneity is not an inherent, passive attribute of a group of objects or
events.  Speaking as though homogeneity were not a constructed category is commonplace—
but wrong.  If A is a valentine and B is a tomato, are they members of a homogeneous class?
The answer is not obvious. Yes, if the class is objects sharing the quality of redness. No, if the
class is objects smaller than a breadbox. See NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 34-39,
71-74 (1968); KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 225-26 (“In the first place, nothing in the universe of
experience is absolutely unique any more than any two things are absolutely alike.  Conse-
quently it is always possible to form classes if the bars are let down and loose enough interpre-
tation of similarity is accepted.”).  Knight accepts far more than Goodman the notion that ho-
mogeneity (and similarity) is to some extent inherent.  But both would agree that grouping
events into classes is far from mechanical in virtually all cases.
Some classification schemes are clearly more useful, and, in some sense (although one
that is quite difficult to articulate, much less defend), more “natural” than others; still, it should
be recognized that they are all imposed on the items or events being classified, thus further
complicating the task of assigning future probabilities.
79. Many risks respond to incentives, but not in a way that makes them appreciably harder
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the various factions in Russia, and the various international actors,
react?  An investor contemplating investing in Russia would have to
guess as to the future course of events in Russia.  But the investor
would not, and indeed should not, have much confidence in her
guess-certainly, not enough confidence to invest, except perhaps at a
very large lemons discount.
Consider an investor contemplating investment opportunities in
Indonesia in the spring of 1998.  In April, then-President Suharto was
considering various ‘responses’ to the crisis his country was facing.
One ‘response,’ a currency board that would tie the Indonesian cur-
rency, the rupiah, to the U.S. dollar80 was likely to motivated by Su-
harto’s desire to enable his relatives to exchange their rupiahs at a
higher rate than they otherwise could. Suharto rejected the idea, ap-
parently in response to negative pressure from the International
Monetary Fund and others:81 Indeed, the IMF thought such a board
had a significant chance of leading to an economic collapse.82  How
was an investor to determine the probability that Suharto would cre-
ate the currency board, or take some other action, perhaps also with
destabilizing potential?  Or accede to the wishes of the International
Monetary Fund?83  The investor might have made a guess, but, again,
to classify into homogenous classes.  For instance, as I discuss in Section IV.B., infra, in stan-
dard theory, one financial structure, high leverage, makes a firm more valuable by constraining
its managers’ ability to fritter away cash.  But these effects are comparatively easy to compute.
The managers’ non-constrained behavior if the firm adopts some other financial structure can
be compared with their constrained behavior.  As discussed in the text, political risk’s response
to incentives is more complex, because of the complex interactions among the many actors in-
volved.
80. See Barry Porter & Simon Beck, Aid Banks Pressure Suharto; World Bank and ADB
Follow Lead and Block Aid to Indonesia, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1998, at 1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Schina File.
81. See Paul Krugman, Rupiah Rasputin: A Currency Board Won’t Solve Indonesia’s Woes,
FORTUNE, April 13, 1998, at 115.
82. See Porter &Beck, supra note 80, at 1.
83. Indeed, this formulation understates the problem, as the analysis in Section IV.A., in-
fra, will make clear.  To apply standard finance methodology to value an investment, we have
to be able to group the possible outcomes by payoff—we would have needed to know, or, more
precisely, make a good enough guess for instance, not just how likely it was that former Presi-
dent Suharto of Indonesia adopted proposed International Monetary Fund reforms, but what
the payoff to investors holding interests in Indonesian firms would have been had he adopted
the reforms.  Similarly, when an investor is considering investing in Russia, she must try to
group the myriad possible outcomes by payoff: say, outcomes 1, 2 and 3 will lead to massive
civil unrest and zero payoff: outcomes 4, 5 and 6 will lead to a new pro-business leader coming
in, and a very high payoff; outcomes 7, 8 and 9 will lead to continued turmoil, and the payoff
will not be certain for a long while.  Where the types of events involved are more standard,
grouping outcomes by payoff becomes feasible: we can say, for instance, that if a product intro-
duction is a success, the payoff to investors holding a particular interest in the firm will be ap-
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not a guess at to which she should have had much confidence.  In-
deed, what actually happened is that on May 21, 1998, after 32 years
in office, during which time he had withstood many crises, President
Suharto resigned.84  The currency board idea appears to have been
dropped, but reaction to the crisis, both by Suharto’s successor,
President Habibie, and the international community, is still evolving.
Whatever else hindsight may tell us about what happened in Indone-
sia, it also tells us that the skittish investor, who knew she did not
know much about what would happen, was right.
The Asian and Russian crises may be extreme, but political risk
not infrequently involves extreme situations with potentially extreme
consequences.  Indeed, for political risk, an investor can have far
more confidence that a consequence could be disastrous than that  its
probability is remote.
IV.  INVESTOR REACTION TO POLITICAL RISK
A.  Investors’ Methodology
The foregoing argues that investors have difficulty pricing politi-
cal risk.  How might this lead to cycling?
There are crises, followed and preceded by periods of apparent
calm.  Investors update their beliefs with each new piece of informa-
tion.  Because the investor often has more reason to think the future
will resemble the recent past than that it will resemble the more dis-
tant past, the updating will often give significant weight to the new
information .
Indeed, what makes political risk especially difficult to predict is
that our store of knowledge does not cumulate efficiently.  Consider
again business failures, many of the business prospects in developed
markets more generally, or life expectancy: as new events occur, our
confidence in our knowledge increases.  But what does the occur-
rence of an “event,” such as the Asian or Russian crisis, suggest
about political risk prospectively?  For all the investor knows, the
world has now changed permanently, with political risk assuming a
more prominent role.  Thus, if there has been a recent crisis or up-
heaval, the investor will be skittish.  After a period of calm, however,
the investor may also have good reason to think that calm will prevail
proximately $x.
84. Keith Richburg, Suharto Steps Down, Names Successor, WASH. POST, May 21, 1998 at
A1.
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in the moderate term.  Since crises and calm alternate, so too does
investor sentiment.
The problem stems from what type of event—or more precisely,
class of events—political risk is.  I argued above that political risk is
quite heterogeneous.  But the starting point of the standard asset
pricing formula, “expected value,” is predicated on, and indeed em-
beds, homogeneity.  Consider a typical expected value computation:
In twenty percent of the cases outcome A (payoff of 1) will occur, in
twenty-five percent outcome B will occur (payoff of 2), and in fifty-
five percent outcome C will occur (payoff of 0).  Translated, this
means that if the universe were run 100 times, 20 times the payoff
should be 1, 25 times the payoff should be 2, and 55 times the payoff
should be 0.  The more times the universe is run, the more times the
proportions should approach 20, 25 and 55.  But the universe is only
going to run once.  The payoff will be 1, or 2, or 0; the investor prices
each “iteration” at .7, even though the payoff will never be .7, be-
cause he treats an iteration as one of many.  And doing so is not only
the best the investor can do, but also “correct,” even though there will
not be multiple iterations.  The events are sufficiently homogeneous
that they can be treated as iterations of one another.
The investor pricing political risk cannot use this methodology
nearly as mechanically.  Political risk can be characterized as a class;
however, each “event” scarcely seems like one iteration of many.  An
investor might plausibly react by making more broad-brush assess-
ments: Either the risk is to be taken, or it is not.  The risk is only
taken if it is acceptably low (or the lemons discount is very high).
The assessment does not distinguish between, for instance, 23%
probability of a particular outcome and 27%, or for that matter 60%
and 70%.  Indeed, for events in heterogeneous classes, what would
such numbers mean?  We only really know what they mean for truly
homogeneous events such as coin tosses.  The less homogeneous a
class of events is, the more difficult it is to construct such honed
probabilities.  How do we characterize the event we suppose would
happen 23% of the time?  Where events within a class are more het-
erogeneous, as is the case for political risk, the imagination has no
ready use for these increments.
The result is to exacerbate the cycling of investor sentiment.
B. The Cycle
Immediately post-crisis, after some dramatic and unfavorable
event has occured, investors are quite skittish; as discussed above, the
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world could have changed permanently, or at least in the short-to-
moderate term, such that instability is now more common.  Few in-
vestors will enter the market.  Those that will are likely to be
“bottom-fishers,” specializing in risky emerging markets or specula-
tive investing.85  They will demand a high lemons discount that ac-
cords with their worst case estimate.  Thus, emerging markets firms
may delay seeking financing, or seek financing from domestic
sources; transaction volume, particularly in foreign markets, should
be low.
As time passes without incident, word will spread, aided by in-
vestment bankers making the “Michael Milken” argument: The lem-
ons discount is higher than the risks warrant.  More investors, in-
cluding more conservative investors, will enter the market, and prices
will fall.  Because there will always be  some lemons discount for po-
litical risk, the securities will be seen as offering an attractive combi-
nation of safety and yield.  Moreover, if investors’ domestic market
rates are low, they may be particularly aggressive in seeking higher-
yielding investments.86  Further, as markets become more global, the
standard for a diversified portfolio increasingly includes emerging
markets securities.87  Demand should increase, and the lemons dis-
count should decrease further; supply, then, should increase, as firms
seek financing to avail themselves of advantageous rates.  So long as
time proceeds without incident, investor confidence should be virtu-
85. See, e.g., Kerry A. Dolan, Riding the Coattails of the Global Boom, FORBES, Apr. 20,
1998, at 58 (describing the investment activities of a wealthy investor, Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin
Talal).  The article asks: “Is it too soon to bottom-fish in Asia? Alwaleed has already cast his lines
there.” Id. at 64. The article proceeds to describe various investments Alwaleed has recently made
in South Korean and Malaysian companies.  The article also notes that “Asia appeals to
[Alwaleed] now because investments there fit an important Alwaleed investment criteria: Rather
than be early, he favors going into a promising situation just after it has taken a bad hit—30% to
50%, preferably.”  Id. at 64.  As discussed in note 5, supra, and accompanying text, in April of
1998, when the articles cited in this note were written, world markets, including some Asian mar-
kets, seemed to be recovering from the Asian flu.  Now, as turmoil again roils world markets, it
will be interesting to see how April’s bottom-fishers have fared, and whether they, or others, are
fishing again.
86. See, e.g., Ipsen, supra note 19 (“Simply put, puny growth and low inflation in the de-
veloped world mean that returns there are puny in comparison to the vibrant emerging market
economies.”).
87. See id. at A1 (“One of the underpinnings of the emerging-market phenomenon is that
the market has now taken its place as a separate so-called asset class, which means that large
institutions intent on having diversified portfolios will find it indispensable to hold some
emerging market debt and equity.”).  According to my practitioner sources, however,
“indispensable” may be an overstatement: they say cautious or quality-conscious investors will
not feel constrained to continue investing in emerging markets securities during times when
emerging markets are unsettled.
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ally self-perpetuating.  Eventually, some upheaval occurs, and the cy-
cle begins again.  And again, cycling is the best investors can do.
When investors are confident, their lemons discount is low; when
they are skittish, their lemons discount is high.  In each case, politi-
cally risky securities are priced correctly; the discount reflects an in-
vestor’s best guess.
C.  Other Explanations
Why else might investor reaction to political risk cycle? I con-
sider two additional explanations.
1.  Agency Costs.  An agency cost dynamic also may be involved.
The first investor making a politically risky investment after a crash
may face greater downside risk if the investment fails than he would
face upside benefit if the investment succeeded.  A significant volume
of funds are invested by agents, such as managers of mutual funds
and pension funds, on behalf of their principals, the funds’
beneficiaries.  These agents’ best strategy may be to avoid below-
average performance rather than to seek above-average
performance.  A comparable dynamic may send investors to
emerging markets once the first has entered.  These incentives
exacerbate the cycle of investor sentiment.  Investor sentiment
immediately post-crisis is more skittish, and the reaction after a
period of calm is more sanguine.  Regulatory constraints add to the
effect: many large institutional investors are subject to regulatory or
legal regimes which reward conformity with other investors over
taking risks.88
2.  Psychological Factors.  Investor reaction to political risk may
to some extent be “irrational.”  Economists and legal scholars are
increasingly considering how human behavior deviates from
rationality.89  Investor reaction to political risk might implicate two
psychological dynamics scholars have identified.  Skittish investors
88. I discuss these matters in Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An
Explanation for Dirty Pooling and Other Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 174-84
(1997) [hereinafter, Financial Appearances] (discussing volume of funds managed by money
managers anxious to do no worse than their peers).  On investors’ herd behavior, see generally
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 32, at 167, and sources cited therein.  Id.  See also Feldstein, su-
pra note 65 (suggesting that portfolio managers and fiduciary committees might also “see their
task as ‘acting prudently’ rather than maximizing a risk-adjusted return” and might therefore
be reluctant to invest more in foreign securities).
89. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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might be overestimating political risk because of their recent
memories of events falling within the class of political risk.  This is
called the “availability bias,” meaning that the information about the
recent event is “available” in a manner that increases a person’s
assessment of its actual probability.  Conversely, confident investors
might be “overconfident,” underestimating the then remote-seeming,
and, on this view, actually remote, likelihood of political risk.
Underestimating remote risks is also a well-documented
psychological dynamic.90  Given the pattern of events falling within
the class of political risk—that is, what happens in the real world—
alternating overestimation and underestimation should not be
surprising.
D. Pricing of Politically Risky Securities
I argued in section IV.B. that investors are pricing politically
risky securities as well as they can—that they are pricing the securi-
ties “correctly.”  By contrast, both the irrationality and agency and
regulatory stories considered in section IV.C. could lead investors to
price such securities “incorrectly.”  The irrational investors might pay
too much because they underestimated political risk.  The investors
described in the agency and regulatory cost stories might pay too
much as well, when maintaining the desired level of emerging mar-
kets investments required paying too-high prices.  Or both sets of in-
vestors might only be willing to pay too little: the irrational investors,
because they overestimate political risk, and the agency and regula-
tory-cost saddled investors, because none of their peers were invest-
ing, or their regulators had discouraged or prohibited such invest-
ments.  But arbitrageurs-investors who do not make pricing mistakes,
and indeed, correct others’ pricing mistakes-stand ready to correct
these mistakes.91
90. Id.  See also Robert A. Olsen, Prospect Theory As An Explanation of Risky Choice by
Professional Investors: Some Evidence, 6 REV. FIN. ECON. 225 (1997), available in LEXIS, Bus-
fin Library, Asapii File (discussing one of the prominent theories in the behavioral literature,
prospect theory).  Among the features of prospect theory are “an overweighting of lower prob-
ability events (but with some small non-zero probabilities being ignored) and an overweighting
of high probability events.”  Id.
91. The mistake-correction process might not proceed as smoothly as it would in most
other cases.  Soon after a crisis, the arbitrageurs likely anticipate that they will shortly know
more, and might hence delay their mistake-correction activities.  Moreover, political risk’s un-
certainty might make arbitrageurs allow a greater margin for error, and they might stop their
activities once a conservative estimate of the correct price had been reached.  Nevertheless, on
my account, pricing mistakes should be small, short-lived, or both. But my theory does not pre-
sume or require the existence of investor mistakes, or, even, the efficacy of arbitrageurs’ mistake-
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E. Implications for Modigliani and Miller’s Capital Structure
Irrelevance Theorem
1.  The Theory and Its Assumptions.  Modigliani and Miller’s
capital structure irrelevance theorem holds that capital structure, the
way a firm chooses to finance itself, cannot add value.92  As is well
known, the theorem’s assumptions are commonly violated in the real
world; a financing vehicle’s added value is traced to one or more
violations of these assumptions.
Among Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions are (1) zero infor-
mation costs and (2) implicitly, that there will be no different claims
on the firm’s cash flows on account of a particular financing transac-
tion (other than the direct claim of the investor providing the fi-
nancing).93  The latter assumption bears some explaining.  It means
that the firm’s cash outflows will not change because the firm chose,
for instance, debt rather than equity (except, of course, to the extent
the debt payments differ from the equity payments).
As is well known, both assumptions are wrong.  Information
costs are positive.  Information is, of course, not free.  And a firm’s
cash outflows are affected by its capital structure.  For instance,
scholars have argued that high levels of debt discipline managers into
frittering away less of a firm’s cash.94
2. Information Costs.  Uncertainty is particularly costly to
appraise.  Most firms, domestic and foreign, have some level of
uncertainty, although typically the uncertainty does not have
consequences as significant as those discussed for political risk.   A
firm might reduce its investors’ aggregate information costs by
confining uncertainty to a smaller part of the firm.95  I have previously
made this argument about domestic securitizations done by firms
correction activities. Rather, I argue that investors are pricing politically securities correctly—that
there are no mistakes to correct.
92. See generally Modigliani & Miller, supra note 33.
93. Statements of the assumptions include Modigliani & Miller, supra note 33, and Eugene
F. Fama, The Effects of Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions, 68 AM ECON. REV. 272
(1978).  See also Hill, Lemons, supra note 6, at 1084-85.
94. See Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
95. Future flows securitization, done by emerging market firms, also confines the uncer-
tainty of political risk to a smaller part of the firm; however, the case for aggregate information
cost reductions is more complicated because the baseline “information costs” are hard to spec-
ify-are foreign investors part of the baseline or not?
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subject to significant uncertainties.96 More generally, confining
uncertainty is one reason why a firm forms a subsidiary or affiliate to
conduct activities engendering uncertainty.  And recent financing
innovations, such as stock whose value tracks a particular portion of a
firm’s operations rather than the whole firm (called “targeted stock”)
might also in part be motivated by the information cost reduction
effects of confining uncertainty.
3.  Financing Decision Independence.  The second assumption,
that a firm’s cash outflows are unaffected by its capital structure, is
violated by transaction structures that limit the pot of assets available
to potential third-party claimants of a firm (I call such structures
“pot-limiting structures”).  All of the structures discussed in the
previous paragraph, save targeted stock, are pot-limiting structures.
Some scholars have condemned firms’ abilities to use pot-limiting
structures,97 arguing that a firm and its “second-party” (contractual)
claimants—the two sets of parties crafting the limitations—are hiding
behind legal structures to avoid paying the “full cost” of doing
business.98  On this view, the value-added to the firm is easy to
explain: the firm shifts some of its costs to non-consenting third
parties.
Putting aside the question of whether such structures do or do
not help firms avoid the full cost of doing business,99 the structures
serve another legitimate function in the face of uncertainty.  The un-
certainty itself imposes costs: confining uncertainty may reduce these
costs, to no one’s detriment, except those seeking transaction costs
from the process of asserting and pressing claims.  Indeed, some
types of third-party claims are in large measure dynamic.  The
amount of damage they cause very much depends on the course the
claim takes, which in turn depends on the complex interaction of the
96. See Hill, Lemons, supra note 6, at 1086-93.  In that article, I argued for the benefits of
confining “residual-style risks” to a smaller portion of the firm.  The concepts “residual-style
risk” and “uncertainty” overlap, but are not identical.  Most, if not all, residual-style risks (risks
associated with the firm’s residual interests) will be to some degree uncertain, but there may be
some uncertainties that are not residual-style risks.
97. See, e.g., Lynn LoPucki, The Death Of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).
98. Id.
99. On a Modigliani and Miller analysis, the firm’s financing decision would indeed have
affected its cash outflows, by reducing the expected outflows by the amounts no longer payable
to the potential third-party claimants. Note, however, that if the firm is shifting risk to uncom-
pensated and nonconsensual risk-bearers, the net result would be zero sum, or perhaps even
negative sum if the firm behaved more recklessly knowing it could not be help responsible
therefor.
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various actors and institutions involved.  Scholars critical of a firm’s
ability to limit particular claimants’ entitlements to part of the firm’s
assets assume that the claims are purely a function of the damage the
firm does and the harm the claimant suffers.  The implicit paradigm is
someone who is injured or killed by the firm’s negligence.  But the
real world is rife with examples of third-party claimants who set in
motion a process able to exact damages exponentially greater than
whatever harm the claimants may have suffered. Obvious examples
include mass and toxic torts.100
Therefore, when a firm uses a pot-limiting structure, it may not
just be playing a zero-sum game in which the losers are the third
party claimants.  In an efficient world, a firm should only have to pay
for actual damages; amounts in excess of actual damages (such as the
massive transaction costs associated with mass and toxic torts) should
neither be borne by the firm nor should the firm’s investors have to
discount therefor.  Thus, a pot-limiting structure should be positive-
sum insofar as it limits the pot available to pay such excess amounts,
and reduces the associated cloud of uncertainty.
This analysis can be extended a step further.  Consider how the
use of pot-limiting transaction structures might affect the risk-
imposition process more generally.  In my account of emerging mar-
kets future flows securitization, I argued that the transaction’s effect
on potential third-party claimants might make such claimants’ pursuit
of their claims more efficient, rather than potentially depriving them
of assets to which they otherwise might be entitled.  The third-party
claimants at issue were sovereigns and other governmental authori-
ties, and more broadly, the legal and regulatory “system” imposing
such risks.
Indeed, the risk—or more precisely uncertainty—imposition
process involved in both political risk and mass and toxic torts seems
intuitively quite inefficient.  The firm’s burden is larger than the
100. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1347 n.12, 1348-49 n.15 (1995).  See also Dan R. Anderson, Financial
and Organizational Impact of Superfund-Mandated Hazardous Waste Liabilities on the Insur-
ance Industry, 49 CPCU JOURNAL 22 (1996), available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File. (“A
significant portion of the total costs is comprised of transaction costs incurred by the govern-
ment, PRP’s (potentially responsible parties), and insurers.”).  The article cites several studies.
One estimates litigation and administration costs as “approximately 40 percent of total Super-
fund costs.”  Id.  Another estimated insurer transaction costs as “88% of their total expendi-
tures.”  Id.  A third study estimated insurer and PRP transaction costs as “at least 35% of all
Superfund related-expenditures.” Id.  See also Sean Mooney, Fickle Tort System Fogs Up
Crystal Ball on General Liability, 101 NAT’L UNDERWRITER (PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK &
BENEFITS MANAGEMENT), Nov. 24, 1997, at 47, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File.
BRANDNEWHILL3MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:32 PM
312 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 8:283
benefit to the third party claimants, as the actors involved pursue
their divergent interests.101  Firms’ attempts to offer their investors
more certainty through careful transaction structuring might make
more costly and visible the third-parties’ risk-imposition.  To the extent
the risk-imposition process is inefficient, making it more costly and
visible could serve to make it more efficient.102
 In sum, I have argued in Section IV.D. that securities pricing
takes account of uncertainty.  The foregoing suggests that transaction
structuring takes account of uncertainty as well.
V. CONCLUSION
No one can predict the future.  Yet, finance theory assumes we
know far more about the future than we actually do.  This assumption
is arguably good enough for most purposes for which it is used.  I
have argued that for politically risky securities, and for other risks
sharing some of political risk’s salient features, the assumption is not
good enough.  In the face of uncertainty, investors do the best they
can; for political risk, the best they can do is to alternate between op-
timism and skittishness, as new events cause significant revisions to
their beliefs and assessments.  Investors know sufficiently little about
political risk that they cannot “homogenize” the category in any
meaningful way: they cannot help imagining that some politically
risky event either will occur or it will not.  When they appraise as
plausible the likelihood of an event with very bad consequences, they
refrain from investing; when they do not, they may invest, taking only
a small lemons discount.
We may one day learn enough to fit political risk better into the
standard pricing model, or to create a model better suited to the task.
I make no claim that our uncertainty, or a pricing model’s ability to
deal with uncertainty, is intractable.103  But at present, it seems hard
101. In some contexts, casting a long shadow of risk, by, for instance, having a reputation
for being dangerous and unpredictable, offers a payoff to the actors involved.  In the context of
political risk, the risk-imposers seem mostly to suffer along with the firms and their investors,
for the spectre of uncertainty over and above the amount of “actual” damages they have suf-
fered.
102. Mass and toxic tort cases will necessarily be visible, and fought to a large extent in the
political arena, regardless of the efforts firms make to shield their investors from the conse-
quences.  Thus, in those contexts, my argument may have more theoretical import than practi-
cal bite.
103. In any event, we have thus far dealt sufficiently well with uncertainty that globalization
of markets, and transaction volume from emerging markets countries has until now been in-
creasing.
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to imagine a world in which we understand political risk as well as we
understand most of the other risks investors face.  One scholar, re-
flecting generally on the treatment of uncertainty in economics, said: 
A key word . . . is uncertainty—genuine, residual uncer-
tainty—not knowing with any substantial confidence many
aspects of what (or how much of what) the future holds. Real
world economic actors, peering ahead in time as they must,
do not love uncertainty. But, on the whole, they accept it ra-
tionally as a fact of life, and, over time, have invented institu-
tions and precautionary tactics of remarkable ingenuity to
shrink it down considerably and otherwise mitigate its nega-
tive effects.
For many economists, by contrast, uncertainty is the ultimate
Hallowe’en scare word. Throw it into a theoretical discus-
sion . . . and horrid visions are conjured of a nihilistic eco-
nomics suddenly stripped of all pretensions to science and
reduced to unstructured, pseudosociological chit-chat. After
the manner of mid-Victorians confronted with sex, immedi-
ate attempts are instituted to cover up or transmute the un-
wanted intruder—to reduce it to safe, mathematically tracta-
ble probability distributions, to treat is as a series of shocks
wholly exogenous to the economic system as modeled, or to
argue that if people simply do the best they can with the in-
formation they do have, the essence of the model remains
unscathed.
This is highly irrational. No good can come from treating in
such dodgy fashion what real-world actors, all but unani-
mously, declare to be one of their central economic anxieties.
Is not the admission of ignorance the beginning of wis-
dom. . .? To be sure, uncertainty, like atomic particles, is not
directly observable. . . .  But what people do about uncer-
tainty. . . is eminently accessible to measurement and analy-
sis.104
We should not be surprised at uncertainty in the rarefied world
of finance. We also should not be surprised that dealing with uncer-
tainty may require some adaptation to the standard models to reflect
a complex event which defies ready, formulaic classification, and the
limitations of our knowledge more generally.  Indeed, adapting such
a methodology to take into account unique, complex and dynamic
events seems eminently rational, both inside and outside the realm of
finance.
104. David McQueen, On rereading Samuelson I: A teacher’s perspective, CHALLENGE,
Mar./Apr. 1994, at 43-44.
